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I.1   Introduction 
  In Connecticut, approximately 357,000 people (of whom 71,000 are children) 
have no health insurance, 10.4% of the state’s population.
1  In part, rising health 
insurance premiums make insurance unaffordable to many employers and individuals 
alike, increasing the ranks of the uninsured.  Uninsurance poses costs on society, 
businesses, and those individuals without insurance.  The uninsured may delay seeking 
treatment because of cost concerns.  This delay can lead for the uninsured to higher 
health care costs and worse health outcomes.  This can impose costs on employers 
through lower productivity or employee absences.  And health care providers or 
taxpayers bear the cost for providing uncompensated health care services.  Both major 
party presidential candidates have plans to address the costs of health insurance and the 
number of uninsured.  Neither candidate proposes comprehensive changes to the current 
health insurance system. 
   The Universal Health Care Foundation of Connecticut commissioned the 
Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis (CCEA) to, estimate the Connecticut-specific 
impacts, in terms of the numbers of newly insured and the associated costs and savings, 
of the two presidential candidates’ plans for firms, households, and government.   
  CCEA examines the Bush and Kerry healthcare proposals as if each one were 
simultaneously passed into law.  In order to compare their plans effectively, we need to 
be able to add up the numbers of newly insured for each candidate's plans and associated 
costs as if each component of their plans were actually in effect for the elected candidate.  
This process involves a hierarchy of consumer choices that successively exhaust the 
eligible populations.  This approach is necessary because certain groups of Connecticut’s 
population would be eligible for more than one plan within each candidate’s array of 
proposals.  In this way, we eliminate overlap (double counting) and obtain the total 
number of newly insured and associated public (federal and state government) and 
private (individuals and firms) sectors’ costs for each candidate’s array of proposals.  
However, it is possible that not all of the elected candidate’s proposals would be enacted 
into law simultaneously.  In that event, our results would not apply.  If only some of the 
                                                 
1 National and state figures based on most recent 2004 release of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement to the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthin03.html  
2 
elected candidate’s proposals’ components were enacted, the number of newly insured 
would be less still than is estimated under a full implementation scenario. 
  To calculate the results described above, CCEA assumes that Connecticut 
residents’ decision of whether to purchase health insurance and what plan to purchase 
depends on the price of a particular plan for which they would be eligible relative to other 
plans and their income.  We define the price of insurance for a household as their out-of-
pocket premium cost.  Thus, we exclude other out-of-pocket expenses such as co-pays 
and deductibles, employer contributions to premiums, costs of travel, and opportunity 
costs.  In other words, CCEA does not estimate changes in total resource usage within the 
health care system based on these policies.  Therefore, the cost estimates presented here 
are actually lower than they would be were these other costs incorporated.   
CCEA compares Connecticut-specific effects of the Bush and Kerry health care 
proposals by building an analytical model for each policy.  To analyze the policies on 
equal footing, we use the same data across policies when possible.  All numbers reported 
derive from analytical models for Connecticut.   
  The crisis in health care insurance results in part from increasing income 
inequality in the United States, with the majority (60%) of households seeing their share 
of national income decline.  According to the U.S. Census, the poorest forty percent 
(40%) of American households have seen their share of income decline systematically, 
by nearly a fifth, between 1970 and 2003.  In 1970, the poorest forty percent of 
households had 14.9% of total household income; by 1990, it had fallen to 13.5%; in 
2003, it was a mere 12.1%.  Even the middle-income group saw their share fall by nearly 
a quarter in the same years, from 17.4% to 14.8%.  The wealthiest 40% of households 
took home much more, raising their share from 67.8% to 73.2%.  To put this pattern in its 
starkest terms, forty percent (40%) of households have nearly three quarters of all income 
and their share is rising; the remaining sixty percent (60%) have barely more than a 
quarter of all income, and their share is falling. 
  The issue is equally striking in terms of constant dollars, that is, taking out the 
effects of inflation.  In 1970, the poorest 20% of Americans had an average income of 
$8,010; that increased by 2001 to $10,136, a gain of about one quarter.  In the same 
period, the top 20% of Americans’ incomes went from $85,607 to $145,970, a gain of  
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more than two thirds.  Given weak income growth for the majority of Americans and the 
fact that health care costs and premiums have gone up more rapidly than overall inflation, 
it is clear that health insurance is becoming increasingly less affordable for the majority 
of Americans.  In the face of such income statistics, it is hard to visualize how a modest 
increase in incentives for self-insurance would do anything more than slow the rate of 
decline in total coverage.  Appendix I from the Center for Budget Policy and Priorities 
provides detail for Connecticut. 
 
I.2  Health Care Platforms:  
  Two approaches to reduce costs and increase coverage 
  Both Bush and Kerry propose to increase health care coverage through incentives 
to households and businesses and through restructuring the health insurance market.  
These initiatives are designed to make the health care system more efficient, ultimately 
reducing health insurance premiums.  The candidates’ proposals are similar in targeting 
small businesses and low-income individuals, which account for the majority of 
uninsured, both nationally and in Connecticut.   
However, the two candidates’ proposals differ significantly in their approach.  
The Kerry plan has a much larger scope than President Bush’s plan and consequently 
larger federal costs.  Philosophically, the Kerry plan accepts the current predominantly 
employer-based health insurance system with government programs patching the gaps.  
Kerry works within this system and seeks to expand it.  President Bush, on the other 
hand, advocates personal ownership, emphasizing non-group and high-deductible 
insurance together with exemptions from state mandates on coverage regulation.  While 
the Kerry plan is more likely than the Bush plan to insure larger numbers of people, the 
Kerry reforms still leave many individuals without affordable insurance options and 
eligibility.  (In the long run—but not in the short-run—that emphasis has the potential to 
move coverage largely away from the current system of employer-based insurance.)  
Neither plan proposes the kind of comprehensive reform needed to change fundamentally 
the current system, to reduce health insurance costs significantly (or the rate of increase 
in the underlying cost of medical care), or to provide insurance to all Connecticut 
residents.  That is, both plans fall short of insuring the 357,000 people currently  
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uninsured in Connecticut.  Furthermore, neither candidate’s proposals fundamentally 
change Connecticut’s current employer-based health insurance system. 
  Overall, cost savings result from efficiency gains in the health insurance market.  
Both the Association Health Plans and the Congressional Health Plan promote efficiency 
gains.  In addition, the extent to which each policy reduces the number of uninsured, 
losses associated with worse health outcomes and uncompensated care will be reduced.  
The Kerry and Bush plans both purport to improve the appropriateness of care and reduce 
overall costs.  The Bush proposal does this by promoting prudent use of care through the 
high-deductible plan-health savings account combination.  The Kerry proposal calls for 
expanding disease management programs.  Neither policy, however, places a premium on 
preventive care.  Only Kerry explicitly includes converting the insurance claims system 
to an electronic system.  Other costs saving measures are beyond the scope of this 
analysis because they do not directly impact the insurance system. 
  Both plans reduce the number of uninsured in Connecticut.  The uninsured 
impose costs on the health care system in terms of uncompensated care, which includes 
care provided at a reduced fee or no charge, and health care bills written-off as bad debt.  
Connecticut’s disproportionate share payment programs originally subsidized providers 
who treated a larger share of Medicaid patients.  Reimbursement rates for Medicaid 
programs were lower than private health insurance reimbursement rates and placed a 
financial burden on institutions whose patients were more likely to be Medicaid 
enrollees.  The disproportionate share payment program (DSH) has expanded to 
compensate healthcare providers
2 treating large numbers of uninsured.  In 2004, 
Connecticut providers will receive $115.2 million
3 in disproportionate share payments 
funded equally by the federal and Connecticut state governments.  CCEA assumes there 
will be savings to the federal and state governments in reduced disproportionate share 
payments based on the number of newly insured under each plan, because increases in 
insured people imply reductions in uncompensated care. 
 
                                                 
2 These include hospitals, federal- and state-funded clinics, and physicians’ and specialized practitioners’ 
practices. 
3 Number excludes State-Administered General Assistance (SAGA) disproportionate share payments 
(DSH).  Without additional plan specifications, CCEA assumes SAGA remains outside our analysis.   
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The Bush Plan: Incentive-based approach to increasing coverage 
The Bush proposal involves three strategies to reduce health care premiums and 
increase coverage:  tax credits for ‘low income’ households, tax deductions for those 
purchasing high-deductible health insurance, and exempting Association Health Plans 
from state health care mandates.  In addition, the Bush plan proposes $1 billion in grants 
nationally to increase children’s enrollments in Medicaid and enhanced Medicaid.  In 
Connecticut, these are the HUSKY plans.   
 
Tax Credits:  The Bush Administration proposes tax credits for households purchasing 
non-group health insurance.  The maximum credits range from $1,000 for a single adult 
making less than $15,000 to $3,000 for a family of four earning less than $25,000 per 
year.  The credits phase out at incomes higher than those described above, reducing to 
zero for individuals making more than $30,000 and households making more than 
$60,000.   
  Average employer-based insurance premiums for individuals and families, 
respectively, are roughly $3,500 to $9,000 (MEPS, 2002).  Assuming households can 
find similarly priced policies, individuals would still have to spend 16% of their income 
and families would spend 24% of their income on insurance premiums alone to utilize 
this tax credit.  Furthermore, without indexing, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of 
this credit would diminish as premiums continue to rise over time.  As the introduction 
makes clear, as real incomes of low- to moderate-income households decline, the share 
of household income taken by health insurance rises and makes it relatively less 
affordable to these households.  That means, in turn, such households are 
progressively less likely to purchase insurance, despite the credits. 
 
Tax Deduction:  Under the Bush proposal, individuals purchasing high-deductible health 
insurance in conjunction with a health savings account would be able to claim an above-
the-line-deduction (before tax) for their insurance premium.  The deduction is available 
regardless of whether the filer itemizes deductions.  Health Savings Accounts have been 
available since January 1, 2004 through Medicare legislation.  Qualifying health care 
purchases and deductibles may be paid from these savings accounts untaxed.  High- 
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deductible insurance is defined as a minimum of $1,000 deductible for individuals and 
$2,500 for family insurance. 
In keeping with the Bush ‘personal ownership’ philosophy, consumers pay the 
costs of routine care from their tax-free health savings account and the high deductible 
premiums cover the cost of major illnesses.  This combination promotes ‘prudent’ use of 
health care services and ‘rewards’ healthy lifestyle choices.  To some extent, this policy 
shifts health care costs from insurers to individuals.  However, the “value” of the tax 
credits is directly proportional to the federal income tax liability of the household, a 
liability that rises with income.  Thus the policy has no value to low-income individuals 
and households; indeed, it hurts them   Only individuals with relatively high incomes—
and thus the necessary tax liability--and the fewest medical needs would be attracted to 
such a program, leaving traditional health care plans to care for sicker individuals with 
higher health care costs.  This situation creates adverse selection, pulling healthy people 
out of group-based plans and potentially raising traditional insurance premiums.   
 
Association Health Plans.  Trade groups or small business associations currently offer 
association health plans.  These plans allow small businesses to band together to reduce 
insurance costs to be competitive with costs to large businesses and to pool 
administrative costs.  The Bush proposal would allow small businesses to offer health 
insurance through association health plans located anywhere in the United States, thus 
specifically exempting insurance offered through these associations from state mandated 
coverage and risk-compression laws.  “In their traditional role as the primary regulators 
of health insurers, states have enacted these and other consumer protections to assure 
appropriate access to health care, ensure fair insurance premiums for all small groups and 
shield consumers from fraudulent marketing schemes.  In short, state regulations ensure 
that consumers, small firms and providers hold onto these protections – protections that 
provide health care reliability.  Consumers in the various states have demanded these 
protections in order to assure the security and dependability of health care coverage.”
4  
                                                 
4 From the Blue Cross Blue Shield report ‘Association Health Plans: No State Regulation Means Loss of 
Protections for Consumers, Small Firms and Providers,’ http://bcbshealthissues.com/relatives/20424.pdf.  
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Appendix II contains a comparison of Connecticut’s mandates with the other states and 
Connecticut’s specific mandates. 
  A consequence of this exemption is that firms’ insurers offering health insurance 
through Association Health Plans could choose to exclude sicker and higher cost 
individuals, as well as selected procedures.  While these characteristics would both 
reduce costs and the risk-rating for the Association Health Plan pool, these sicker 
individuals would either fall into non-Association Health Plans, increasing their risk-
rating and their premium costs, or lose coverage altogether.  As with the proposals 
discussed above, this approach suffers from adverse selection.  CCEA estimates 
Association Health Plans could reduce premiums for participating businesses by as much 
as 13%, and increase premiums for non-Association Health Plans by 2%. 
 
Kerry Plan: Expanding coverage by increasing access to existing government 
programs 
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry offers an array of subsidies and tax 
credits to business and target population groups.  The Kerry proposal would expand 
Medicaid for ‘low-income’ individuals and include several cost-saving measures related 
to health expenditures.   
 
The Congressional Health Plan (CHP ) and Tax Credits:  Small businesses, unemployed 
workers, individuals aged 55-64, and anyone not covered by other proposals, would be 
able to buy into the Congressional Health Plan.  Kerry’s most recent information implies 
that the Congressional Health Plan would be based on the Federal Employees Health 
Benefit Plan and allow individuals or businesses to create a sizeable insurance pool to 
purchase health insurance policies, including comprehensive policies.  The Kerry plan 
would also offer the following tax credits: (1) small businesses would receive a 50% 
refundable tax credit toward their premium contributions; they must contribute at least of 
50% of the total premium; (2) low-to-moderate-income unemployed would receive a 
75% premium subsidy for up to 6 months;  (3) Low-to-moderate income individuals aged 
55-64 would receive a 25% tax credit toward premiums;  and , (5) expenditures on  
8 
insurance premiums would be capped at no more that 6% of family income at 100% of 
the Federal Poverty Level  (FPL), increasing to 12% of family income at 300% FPL. 
  The Congressional Health Plan would be open to small businesses and anyone 
purchasing non-group insurance.  Modeled on the current Federal Employees Health 
Benefit Plan, the Congressional Health Plan would spread risk and administrative costs 
over a national cohort.  Creating this kind of exchange increases competition among 
insurers to provide more insurance for lower premiums.  The Congressional Health Plan 
could reduce costs by 10% or more than $600 annually, from the average Connecticut 
premium, $6,140.  Based on the most recent state-level data from the MEPS 2002, this 
premium is a weighted average of single, single plus one, and family premiums for small 
businesses. 
  The Kerry plan offers a series of tax credits targeting the unemployed and ‘near-
elderly’.  These groups are less likely to be covered by the employer-based health 
insurance system and the ‘near-elderly’ may, in fact, choose to switch jobs or retire once 
they have access to competitively priced non-group insurance.  Overall, premium 
reductions would range from a maximum of 81% for the unemployed in poverty to 17% 
for households between 200-300% FPL who are not 55-64, or are unemployed.  No 
household in poverty would spend more than 6% of their income on health insurance 
premiums.   
 
Stop-loss health care pool.  Under the Kerry proposal, the federal government would act 
as a re-insurer for employer-based health insurance for up to 75% of the catastrophic 
costs insureds incur per episode of care above $50,000.
5  This will reduce the cost of 
health insurance to employers by 10% in exchange for expanding coverage and 
implementing disease management (HR Policy Association, 2004, Thorpe, 2004).  Firms 
enrolling in this program must meet three conditions:   
(1) employers must cover all workers in their firms;
6  
(2) employers must encourage the introduction of disease management
7 programs; and  
                                                 
5 Thorpe (2004) and others have estimated that a threshold of costs above $36,000 would be needed for the 
first year to reach the 10% premium reduction target.  
6 It is not clear whether this includes part-time workers, early retirees, etc.  (HR Policy Association, 2004) 
For the purposes of this analysis, we follow Thorpe (2004) by including part time workers at pro-rated 
support and excluding early retirees.   
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(3) employers must demonstrate how they will share the savings from these programs 
with workers.  
 
Expansion of Medicaid and S-CHIP (HUSKY) programs to include: (1) children in 
families under 300% (FPL); (2) parents in families under 200% FPL; and (3) single 
adults and childless couples in poverty.  The federal government would cover the cost of 
insuring children in HUSKY A and B programs and ask states to cover the cost of 
expanding coverage to adults (Kerry and Edwards, 2004).  The enrollment processes will 
be simplified and the five-year eligibility time limit for legal immigrants will be removed.  
States that reach 90-95% of potential enrollment will receive additional federal bonuses 
worth an anticipated national total of $5 billion dollars.  Below this enrollment threshold, 
however, the policy could act as an unfunded mandate to states.  See the section below on 
low-income household impacts.  For Connecticut, only parents between 100-200% FPL 
and childless adults under 100% FPL who are not eligible for State-Administered General 
Assistance (SAGA) would be newly eligible.  There would be 53,211 newly eligible 
Connecticut adults. 
 
Cost Reduction Strategies:  The Kerry proposal involves cost reduction strategies to help 
defray program costs.  It proposes expanding current electronic insurance claims systems 
to reduce the adjustment cost per claim, requiring public insurers (Medicaid and 
Medicare) to adopt this system and providing incentives for other providers to switch.  
Kerry plans to implement disease management programs, both expanding current public 
initiatives and encouraging the private sector to do so through the Stop-Loss Reinsurance 
Pool.   Other Kerry cost reduction strategies include cost containment programs for 
prescription drugs.  Kerry proposes quality assurance programs for the privately insured 
through a patient’s bill of rights.  For federal health care programs, Kerry proposes to 
ensure quality by maintaining funding and ensuring a choice of health insurance plans. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The term ‘disease management’ is an umbrella term that incorporates very different types of programs.  
The Kerry plan does not specify what type of disease management programs would be implemented.  To 
estimate cost savings, CCEA models potential cost savings based on state level experiences in Washington, 
and Florida, which mandated cost savings in contracts with private disease management companies.  These 
programs target individuals with specific chronic illnesses, like congestive heart failure, diabetes, etc. and 
encourage the use of best practice treatment standards for patients and their physicians alike.     
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I.3  Methodology, Data and Limitations 
  Recapitulating the introduction, CCEA examines the Bush and Kerry healthcare 
proposals as if each one were simultaneously passed into law.  In order to compare their 
plans effectively, we need to be able to add up the numbers of newly insured for each 
candidate's plans and associated costs as if each component of their plans were actually in 
effect for the elected candidate.  This process involves a hierarchy of consumer choices 
that successively exhaust the eligible populations.  This approach is necessary because 
certain groups of Connecticut’s population would be eligible for more than one plan 
within each candidate’s array of proposals.  In this way, we eliminate overlap (double 
counting) and obtain the total number of newly insured and associated public (federal and 
state government) and private (individuals and firms) sectors’ costs for each candidate’s 
array of proposals.  However, it is possible that not all of the elected candidate’s 
proposals would be enacted into law simultaneously.  In that event, our results would not 
apply.  If only some of the elected candidate’s proposals’ components were enacted, the 
number of newly insured would be less still than is estimated under a full implementation 
scenario. 
 
  To calculate the results described above, CCEA assumes that Connecticut 
residents’ decision of whether to purchase health insurance and what plan to purchase 
depends on the price of a particular plan to them relative to other plans and their income.  
We define the price of insurance for a household as their out-of-pocket premium cost.  
Thus, we exclude other out-of-pocket expenses such as co-pays and deductibles, 
employer contributions to premiums, costs of travel, and opportunity costs.  In other 
words, CCEA does not estimate changes in total resource usage within the health care 
system based on these policies.  Therefore, the cost estimates presented here are actually 
lower than they would be were these other costs incorporated.   
CCEA compares Connecticut-specific effects of the Bush and Kerry health care 
proposals by building an analytical model for each policy.  To analyze the policies on 
equal footing, we use the same data across policies when possible.  All numbers reported 
derive from analytical models for Connecticut.    
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We draw primarily on three data sources for Connecticut: the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and Kaiser Family 
Foundation (KFF) State Health Facts Online.  To build the analytical models, CCEA 
utilizes existing research relevant to each specific policy, drawing on both technical 
literature and policy-oriented research.  As appropriate, CCEA holds relevant 
assumptions consistent across analyses.  In some cases, lack of detail in the proposed 
policy or lack of relevant existing research requires us to make reasonable additional 
assumptions.  The technical appendix accompanying this report provides details of this 
analysis.   
Estimates are for a ‘typical’ one-year implementation based on current 
Connecticut demographics.  Total costs include the broader financial costs of insurance 
paid by employers, individuals, and governments.  We report federal and state 
governments’ cost estimates separately.  Private (sector) costs include those costs that 
households and firms would incur. 
 
Limitations 
The analyses flow from the proposed health reforms as stated during August 2004 
and focus on those policies affecting the number of uninsured in Connecticut.  
Subsequent changes to the platforms have been incorporated in our analysis to the extent 
possible.  However, we omit the Bush refundable tax credits proposal that would offer 
credits ranging from $200 to $500 to small business contributions to health savings 
accounts, and we omit the Bush proposal to allow individuals to purchase health 
insurance from other states from the analysis.  (The latter proposal implies eliminating 
ALL state mandates on coverage, eligibility, and premium compression, creating a single 
national market for health insurance.)  CCEA also excludes policies unrelated to health 
insurance or relating to incentives.  Both sides advocate malpractice reform, electronic 
medical records, Medicare and prescription drugs plans, but these issues are beyond the 
scope of this analysis.  
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II.  Results: Costs and Effects of the Candidates’ Proposals 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the Bush and Kerry plan costs and effects.   
Table 1:  Costs and Effects of the Bush Plan in Connecticut 
  Enrollees  Change in 
Insured 









Tax Credit  49,536 9,328 $275.8 $62.4  - 
Tax Deduction  82,936 -749 $485.8 $79.2  - 
Association Health 
Plan 59,667 2,869 $255.5  -    - 
Total  192,139 11,448 $1,017.1 $141.6  - 





Total Savings      -$7.2 -$3.6  -$3.6
Total Net Cost      $1,009.9
 b $138
 b    -$3.6
 b
  
Table 2:  Costs and Effects of the Kerry Plan in Connecticut 
  Enrollees  Change in 
Insured 













96,440 70,722 $433.4  $108.3  - 
Stop Loss 
Reinsurance Pool 
204,692 88,263  $907.5  $90.8  - 
Medicaid Expansion 
and Cost Swap 
13,303 11,374 $30.5  $263.3  -$232.9 
Tax Credits:           
Unemployed 5,269  1,658  $34.7  $12.6  - 
55-64 5,537  732  $33.5  $8.4   
Those not qualifying 
for other plans 
43,914 9,186  $265.4  $38.6 - 
Total  369,154  181,936  $1,705
 b  $522
 b  -$232.9
 b 
Cost Savings:           
Information 
Technology 
  -$24.2  -$7.3  -$2 
Disease Management      -$39.1  -$30.3  -$8.8 
Disproportionate 
Share Payment 
  -$58.7  -$29.4  -$29.4 
Total Savings      -$122  -$67  -$40.2 
Total Net Cost      $1,582.9 
b  $388




All costs in $ millions; 
b




As Tables 1 and 2 suggest, under the Kerry plan, 181,936 currently uninsured 
Connecticut individuals would gain insurance.  Under the Bush plan, 11,448 Connecticut 
individuals would gain insurance.  Although the Kerry plan clearly expands coverage 
more than the Bush plan, both plans fall short of insuring the 357,000 currently uninsured 
in Connecticut.   
The Kerry plan costs more than the Bush plan but insures proportionately more 
people.  The federal costs of the Kerry plan are almost four times that of the Bush plan, 
but the total costs—including state, business, and households’ costs--of the Kerry plan 
are only 1.5 times the Bush plans’ costs.  This suggests that although the Bush plan costs 
the federal government less than the Kerry plan, the private sector (households and firms) 
pays disproportionately more of the Bush plans’ implementation costs than the private 
sector pays for the Kerry plans’ implementation costs.  These costs include the costs of 
insuring individuals and do not include additional out-of-pocket, time, or opportunity 
costs.  
Under the Kerry plan, 181,936 Connecticut individuals who were previously 
uninsured would gain insurance.  Under the Bush plan, 11,448 Connecticut individuals 
would gain insurance.  Although the Kerry plan clearly expands coverage more than the 
Bush plan, both plans fall short of insuring the 357,000 currently uninsured in 
Connecticut.   
Each candidate’s plans affect specific groups disproportionately.  Below, CCEA 
highlights the impact on specific Connecticut groups.  
 
Small Business 
In Connecticut, 52.5% of Connecticut’s 60,755 small businesses (firms with less 
than 50 employees) presently offer insurance to their employees (MEPS, 2002).
8  Under 
the Kerry plan, 8,912 (13.48%) Connecticut small businesses would begin to offer 
insurance.  Under the Bush plan, 471 (0.775%) Connecticut small businesses would 
begin to offer insurance.  Another 12,153 Connecticut small businesses would switch 
from their current insurance provider to the Kerry Congressional Health Plan to realize 
                                                 




savings.  Under the Bush plan, 9,804 Connecticut small businesses would switch from 
their current insurance provider to join the proposed Association Health Plans.  
The Bush plan would enroll an estimated 59,667 Connecticut residents and insure 
an additional 2,869 residents.  This newly insured figure accounts for individuals with 
greater health care needs that would either lose their insurance or fall on the traditional 
health care system, raising costs for everyone enrolled in those plans.  The Kerry plan 
would cover 96,440 employees of small businesses, including 70,722 newly insured.  
For Connecticut, the Kerry plan will cost the federal government $108.3 million 
to implement, while the Bush plan costs the federal government nothing.  By exempting 
Association Health Plans from existing state mandates, however, the Bush plan may 
reduce the comprehensiveness of coverage firms offer and raise insurance premiums for 
non-Association Health Plan coverage.   
 
Low-Income Households 
  Connecticut and 34 other states have computed a “self-sufficiency wage” standard 
as an alternative to the federal poverty formula.  This approach takes into account 
variations in cost of living in different parts of the country or in a state.  The Connecticut 
analysis calculates the self-sufficiency wage for twelve (12) regions and five (5) family 
structures, with multiple subdivisions for the age structure of children.  In 1998, the 
sufficiency wage for these different family structures ranged from roughly $30,000 to 
$40,000 on an annual basis.  Adjusting for inflation in the past six years, one may 
reasonably estimate that the current range is $33,000 to $44,000.  Yet if Connecticut 
patterns of income growth are similar to national patterns, many Connecticut households 
will experience their incomes stagnating or even declining, making purchasing health 
insurance an increasing challenge. 
  Low-income households in Connecticut are more likely to be uninsured than 
higher-income households.  Thirty-five percent of households with incomes below the 
FPL are uninsured (KFF, 2004).  For households between 100% and 200% FPL, 22% are 
uninsured (KFF, 2004).  This figure contrasts with 4% of individuals without insurance in 
households with incomes above 300% FPL.  For a family of three, 300% FPL is an 
income of roughly $50,000 per year.  
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  The Bush plan addresses low-income uninsured through his tax credit for non-
group insurance purchases.  As mentioned above, this tax credit covers only one-third of 
the average insurance premiums.  Households poor enough to receive the maximum 
credit would need to spend a minimum of between 16% to 24% of their household 
income to take advantage of this credit.  
 In Connecticut, CCEA estimates that 49,638 individuals would use this tax 
credit.  Only 9,317 of these individuals would be newly insured.  Most households likely 
to use the tax credit already purchase non-group insurance; for them, this tax credit 
represents a premium subsidy.  For Connecticut, the total cost to the federal government 
is $62.5 million, with Connecticut households bearing $213.9 million in insurance 
premiums.   
The Kerry plan offers an array of programs for low-income households.  In 
Connecticut, the Medicaid expansions target parents with incomes less than 200% FPL 
and childless adults below 100% FPL.  The tax credits (for unemployed and 55-64 year 
olds) and the health insurance expenditures cap target low-to-moderate income 
households (incomes less than 300% FPL).  In total, the Kerry proposals would insure 
22,950 Connecticut low-income individuals who currently have no health insurance.  For 
Connecticut, the federal cost of these changes is $64.3 million and the state cost is $25.7 
million.  This compares favorably with the Bush proposals that cost $62.5 million 
federally (for Connecticut) but insure less than half the number of previously uninsured.   
  The Kerry plan proposes to relieve states of the burden of the state costs of the 
children’s Medicaid program (HUSKY, in Connecticut) in exchange for implementing 
the proposed Medicaid expansion to parents (100-200% FPL) and childless adults (less 
than 100% FPL).  Adding the costs of this swap to the costs of the low-income programs 
described above, Connecticut’s share of the federal cost of the Kerry low-income plans is 
$263.3 million.  Connecticut experiences a net reduction (savings) of $232.9 million in its 
Medicaid expenditures. 
Both candidates offer states incentives to increase Medicaid enrollment among 
children.  President Bush proposes $1 billion in grants nationally to increase enrollments.  
Senator Kerry proposes $5 billion in new bonuses for states that enroll 90%-95% of  
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eligible children.  Neither plan gives sufficient detail on how these funds would be 
distributed to include their impact in the summary tables presented above.   
However, CCEA does estimate how much Connecticut would need to cover 90-
95% of Medicaid eligible children who are uninsured.  There are 53,065 uninsured 
children who are Medicaid-eligible in Connecticut.  Under the existing HUSKY A and 
HUSKY B programs, it would cost $109 to $115.1 million to insure 90% to 95% of these 
children.  The federal and state governments would need to spend $108.7 to $114.7 
million and enrolled households would altogether pay $351,000 to $371,000 in shared 
premiums.  Households would also pay out-of-pocket charges such as health service co-
payments, etc., but these are not included in this estimate.  In addition to program costs, 
Connecticut would need to engage in outreach and enrollment activities that would 
require additional funds.   
In order to remain cost-neutral in such an expansion, Connecticut would need to 
receive at least $109 to $115.1 million from government.  Given that all states would 
share in the grants and bonuses, both plans fall short of fully funding the expansion.  The 
Kerry plan does provide some additional funding in the Medicaid cost swap, which, in 
combination with his bonuses could potentially fund the expansion.   
 
Demographic Effects 
CCEA presents key findings for three age groups: children, young adults, and the 
‘near elderly’.  Neither candidate’s program increases health insurance coverage for 
children disproportionately.  Healthy young adults are more likely to gain insurance 
under the Bush high deductible, health savings account combination.  The ‘near-elderly’ 
benefit from the Kerry tax credit.   
The Kerry plan proposes a Medicaid expansion for children under 300% FPL.  
Connecticut covers this population of children under the HUSKY program.  Therefore, 
there may not be an increase in the absolute numbers of children insured.  To some 
extent, including parents in the Medicaid system (up to 200% FPL) may increase the 
take-up rate among Connecticut’s uninsured children (under 300% FPL).  Yet, the new 
programs do not substantially increase eligibility in this group.    
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In the ‘Low-Income’ section above, we discuss grants under the Bush and Kerry 
plans’ incentives to increase children’s enrollment in HUSKY.  Given that all states 
would share in the grants and bonuses, both plans fall short of fully funding the 
expansion.  Insuring children is particularly important because children without health 
insurance have poorer educational attainment and developmental outcomes (CCEA, 
2004).  
Young adults (18-34) are most likely to be uninsured in Connecticut.
9  Overall, 
this population has fewer health care needs than other population segments.  This 
population is ideal for the Bush high deductible, health savings account combinations or 
Association Health Plans that target healthier individuals.  Qualitatively, CCEA expects 
this population to increase its insurance enrollment.   
A small number of Connecticut ‘near-elderly,’ who would not be otherwise 
eligible or insured, is eligible for the Kerry tax credit.  A total of 5,537 Connecticut ‘near-
elderly’ individuals purchase non-group insurance under the Kerry proposal, including 
732 newly insured Connecticut ‘near-elderly’.  This represents about a 50% take-up rate 
among those eligible for only this program.  Health insurance is particularly critical for 
this group because their health care costs are large and uncertain (Gruber and Madrian, 
1993).  The Kerry plan helps reduce the number of uninsured in this age category. 
 
Minorities  
Currently, minorities in Connecticut are disproportionately less likely to have 
health insurance than non-minorities.  According to CDC (2003), Hispanics are almost 
five times as likely as Caucasian Connecticut residents to be uninsured while African-
Americans are 2.3 times more likely to be uninsured than Caucasian people in 
Connecticut.  These racial and ethnic disparities are an on-going problem for the state.  
Neither candidate’s plan sufficiently addresses this gap.   
Both platforms rely heavily on tax credits and tax deductions for non-group 
insurance purchases.  Studies have found Hispanics were half as likely as Caucasian 
individuals to purchase non-group insurance and African-Americans were 41% as likely 
                                                 
9 According to CCEA (2004), 24% of adults aged 18-24 and 17.3% of adults aged 25-34 are uninsured in 
Connecticut.  
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as Caucasians to purchase non-group insurance (Saver, et al., 2003).  This finding 
suggests that tax credits will benefit Caucasian Connecticut residents relative to 
Hispanics and African-Americans.  
The Kerry Medicaid expansion targets low-income individuals and, to the extent 
that minorities are disproportionately in poverty (28% of Connecticut’s African-
Americans and 32% of Connecticut’s Hispanics compared to 7% of Connecticut’s 
Caucasians), they could benefit from the Kerry program.  Both Kerry and Bush offer 
incentives for increasing enrollment, especially in the S-CHIP (HUSKY) program.  
Additionally, Kerry proposes to reduce enrollment restrictions by allowing registration 
through schools and community clinics.  Further, Kerry would remove the five-year wait 
period for legal immigrants to enroll in Medicaid.  All of these proposals are a step in the 
right direction.  To illustrate the case for Connecticut, the Center for Survey Research and 
Analysis (CSRA, 2000) at the University of Connecticut conducted a survey in Hartford 
in which 41% of Medicaid (HUSKY A) enrollees were Hispanic, 48% were African-
American and 4% were Caucasian.  Increasing outreach in minority communities and 
reducing ‘red-tape’ surrounding enrollment is key to expanding coverage (CSRA, 2000).   
The extent to which these proposals would increase enrollment in Connecticut 
depends on how energetically they are implemented.  In Connecticut, the overall 
expansion in Medicaid eligibility is modest (see above).  Enrolling those currently 
eligible appears to be essential to increasing substantially the number of low-income 
minority households with health insurance.   
CCEA assumes that employer based health insurance expansions would increase 
coverage for minorities and non-minorities alike.  Even so, Bush employer-based health 
insurance proposals newly insure 2,869 Connecticut residents while the Kerry employer- 
based health insurance proposals newly insure 158,985 Connecticut residents.  Minorities 




  We conclude that the Bush and Kerry plans offer a range of proposals that attempt 
to increase health insurance coverage and reduce healthcare costs to individuals and 
firms.  In Kerry’s case, this occurs by expanding the existing partnership between  
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employers and the federal and state governments.  Kerry emphasizes shared 
responsibility.  President Bush’s plans promote individual responsibility through tax 
credits and deductions and an expansion of association health plans into a national 
market.  The latter component of the Bush plans has a negative consequence of 
exempting association health plans from state mandates that protect consumers from 
exclusionary practices among other things.   
  Our task has been to estimate the impact of these candidates’ proposals as they 
relate to Connecticut.  To do so, we estimate the relevant populations of Connecticut 
individuals and firms eligible for each proposal.  Our focuses are Connecticut firms with 
fewer than 50 workers, Connecticut’s ‘near-elderly’, unemployed, and low-income 
households, and Connecticut’s Hispanic and African-American households.  Our 
operating premise is that firms and individuals measurably respond to health insurance 
price changes and, combined with take up rates, imply changes in the number of 
uninsured Connecticut people.  The changes in the uninsured population then imply 
changes in costs to individuals and firms as well as to the federal and Connecticut state 
governments.   
  The most significant message of our analysis is that neither candidate’s proposals, 
even if all of them were enacted simultaneously, would cover all of Connecticut’s 
currently 357,000 uninsured.  The Kerry plans come closest adding 181,936 newly 
insured, while the Bush plans add 11,324 newly insured, that is, the Kerry plans increase 
health insurance coverage 16 times more than the Bush proposals do.  The Kerry plans 
would insure 70,722 currently uninsured workers in Connecticut’s small businesses, 
while the Bush plans would insure 9,804 more small businesses’ workers, that is, the 
Kerry plans would insure 7.21 times more workers than the Bush plans would.  CCEA 
estimates that 156,986 low- to moderate-income Connecticut individuals would 
participate in the Kerry tax credit plan, health insurance expenditure cap and his 
Medicaid expansion plan that altogether would increase Connecticut’s insured by 22,950 
people.   
  The total (public and private) cost of implementing the Kerry plans is $1,582.9 
million, while the total (public and private) cost of implementing the Bush plans is 
$1,019.6 million.  Connecticut’s share of the federal cost of implementing the Kerry  
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plans is $528.1 million and Connecticut’s share of the federal cost of implementing the 
Bush plans is $139.9 million.  Under the Bush plans, Connecticut realizes savings of $3.2 
million, while under the Kerry plans, Connecticut realizes savings of $346.2 million 
which is more than 108 times as much savings than the Bush plans pass along to 
Connecticut.   
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APPENDIX I: Center for Budget Policy and Priorities Report 
 
INCOME INEQUALITY HAS INCREASED IN CONNECTICUT SINCE THE 1970s 
 
  Inequality has increased in Connecticut over the past two decades.  This can be 
observed by ranking all Connecticut families according to their income level, dividing 
them into five of equal size, and calculating the average income of each fifth of families.  
This analysis shows by the late 1990s: 
• The richest 20 percent of families had average incomes 9.4 times as large as the poorest 
20 percent of families. 
• The richest 20 percent of families had average incomes 2.7 times as large as the middle 
20 percent of families. 
 
The Long-Term Trend 
  Since the late 1970s, income inequality has increased in Connecticut.  The 
economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s was not shared evenly among the poor, the rich, 
and the middle class.  Instead, the top fifth of families fared substantially better than other 
income groups.  In the late 1970s, the richest 20 percent of families had average incomes 
6.1 times as large as the poorest 20 percent of families.  By the late 1990s, that ratio had 
grown to 9.4.  This increase in inequality was the sixth greatest in the nation. 
• The average income of the poorest fifth of families increased by $1,130 between the 
late 1970s and the late 1990s, from $18,220 to $19,350. 
• The average income of the middle fifth of families increased by $16,160 between the 
late 1970s and the late 1990s, from $49,990 to $66,150.
10 
• The average income of the richest fifth of families increased by $70,150 between the 
late 1970s and the late 1990s, from $111,040 to $181,190. 
 
The Recent Trend 
  Over the past decade, income inequality has increased in Connecticut.  In the late 
1980s, the richest 20 percent of families had average incomes 6.2 times as large as the 
poorest 20 percent of families.  By the late 1990s, that ratio had increased to 9.4.  This 
                                                 
10 The direction of this change is not statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. 
Source: Economic Policy Institute/Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Pulling Apart: A State-by-State 
Analysisof Income Trends, April 2002.  
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increase in inequality was the largest in the nation.  The gap between the rich and the 
middle class also increased.  This increase was the fifth greatest in the nation. 
• The average income of the poorest fifth of families decreased by $4,670 between the 
late 1980s and the late 1990s, from $24,020 to $19,350. 
• The average income of the middle fifth of families increased by $1,020 between the late 
1980s and the late 1990s, from $65,130 to $66,150.
13 
• The average income of the richest fifth of families increased by $31,640 between the 
late 1980s and the late 1990s, from $149,560 to $181,190.  
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APPENDIX I: Blue Cross Blue Shield Report on State Mandates 
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